Social Work Intervention with the Aged: Toward a Change in the Institutionalized Thought Structure by Gottschalk, Shimon S. et al.
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 11
Issue 1 March Article 3
March 1984
Social Work Intervention with the Aged: Toward a
Change in the Institutionalized Thought Structure
Shimon S. Gottschalk
Florida State University
Michael Frumkin
Florida State University
Allan V. Kaufman
Florida State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Clinical and Medical Social Work Commons, Gerontology Commons, and the Social
Work Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work at
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact
maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gottschalk, Shimon S.; Frumkin, Michael; and Kaufman, Allan V. (1984) "Social Work Intervention with the Aged: Toward a Change
in the Institutionalized Thought Structure," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 11 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol11/iss1/3
SOCIAL WORK INTERVENTION WITH THE AGED
Toward a Change in the Institutionalized
Thought Structure
SHIMON S. GOTTSCHALK
MICHAEL FRUMKIN
ALLAN V. KAUFMAN
Florida State University
Tallahassee, Florida
ABSTRACT
The social problems associated with
aging are viewed as derived from a series
of socially defined meanings in the areas
of: (1) power/authority,(2) responsibility,
(3) productivity/work, (4) dependence/
independence,and (5) knowledge/rationality.
A parallel series of alternative meanings
is proposed which make possible the
creation of alternative institutional forms
which hold promise for making contemporary
problems substantially obsolete. An era of
post-professinalism is envisioned in which
helping agents become political activists
committed to social change on the
cognitive, as well as the material level.
Introduction
We view social problems as the product
of collective, socially and historically
based human imagination. Similarly,
institutional responses to these social
constructs are the product of their time
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and their place in history. The
identification and the specification of a
social problem largely determines the
nature of its solution. (1)
It is our purpose to apply these
propositions to the problems and issues
associated with aging and old age in our
society. We begin by suggesting that, for
the aged, the main problem may well be that
aging itself is viewed as a problem.
Our approach is importantly influenced
by both the sociology of knowledge and by
modern critical theory. (2) We proceed
form the assumption that, what in any
society is defined as knowledge and as
real, is an essential determinant of, and
in turn determined by the social
institutions that characterize that
society. Thus, to change reality involves,
among other things, the reconstruction of
social meanings.
This paper will examine elements of the
existing institutionalized thought
structure (ITS) which have a specific
affect upon aging. (3) Thereafter, it will
suggest a series of alternative
conceptualizations which, to our mind, hold
the promise of changing the meaning of
growing older in a way that will
importantly reduce the oppressions that are
increasingly experienced by all of us as we
advance through the life course. It will
conclude with some ideas on how social
workers might have an impact upon changing
societal perceptions of aging and upon the
social services which have been established
to respond to the perceived problems of
older people.
A Conceptual Overview
Every society, as much as every
individual, strives to achieve and maintain
conceptual coherence, i.e. a means of
organizing and giving meaningful relevance
to the complexity of human experience. (4)
The very possibility of meaningful
communication among humans and the
existence of society as such hinges upon
this phenomenon, which leads to what Roland
Warren called, The Institutionalized
Thought Structure.
Institutionalized thought structures
are composed of loosely related, though not
necessarily logically consistent, value-
laden cognitive elements which dominate,
explain, and give shape and legitimacy to
the social order. (5) Though the
institutionalized thought structure is a
human product, it is commonly experienced
as objective reality, as if it were eternal
truth and logic. The ITS will vary from
epoch to epoch and from society to society.
It is never static, rather it constantly
changes. The major ideas, institutions,
and problems of any society may be viewed
as an expression of a unique ITS emerging
within a particular cultural/historical
context. (See Figure I). These three
elements, i.e. meanings, institutions, and
problems, act upon each other in a mutually
casual manner. It is not that one is
regularly antecedent to the other, but they
must somehow "make sense" within the
context of the ITS.
As we have suggested, the ITS serves as
a conservative force within any given
society in the best sense of the word,
providing for continuity and therefore for
a desired and necessary element of
predictability in human affairs. But how
might change, especially planned change, in
the ITS occur?
The change we are discussing is not
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limited to changes in a particular
institution, e.g. a specific policy or
program, or in a particular idea or item of
knowledge, but rather to changes in the
fundamental thought structure of the
society, e.g. the meaning of success, the
concept of self, or the essential
relationship of human beings to nature. We
postulate that significant changes in
social institutions will take place only
when there are fundamental changes in the
ITS.
Within relatively stable historical
contexts, as for example in isolated
peasant societies, the institutionalized
thought structure is unlikely to be
questioned or challenged. Under
circumstances of modest instability what
Radcliffe-Brown calls "readjustment
changes" may take place. Examples of this
kind of change are discussed by Piven and
Cloware, and by Warren, Rose, and
Bergunder. (6) But in an increasingly
turbulent society, with the emergent
awareness of severe contradictions, and as
the consequence of the application of
individual and collective genius, major
challenges to the ITS may result. (7) An
example of one of the most dramatic of such
thought revolutions in the Western world
occurred during the first and second
century CE, sparked by the genius of Paul
of Tarsus. Fifteen centuries later,
Gallileo played a different, but similar
role. (8)
One way to think about changes in the
ITS is to appropriate the scheme of Thomas
S. Kuhn, who, in his analysis of the
history of science, distinguishes between
normal science and extraordinary science.
(9) Normal science produces incremental
changes within the context of the existing
thought structure. It is largely concerned
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with verification, replication, and
expanded application of received knowledge
within the sciences. By contrast,
extraordinary science permits new paradigms
to emerge. Kuhn views the development of
scientific knowledge not as a continuous
process of growth but as an uneven process
punctuated by extraordinary events. These
extraordinary and fundamental reconceptual-
izations are brought into the forefront as
a consequence of the accretion of anomalies
which cannot be resolved within the context
of normal science. One of the best known
examples of such an occurence is the
Copernican "revolution" which undermined
the "normal" concept, that the earth is the
center of the universe.
Kuhn's concept of paradigms has been
criticized for meaning nearly all things to
all people. (10) It will not satisfy those
who require all scientific truth and
knowledge to be measureable and
quantifiable. (But this, too, is a
paradigmatic constellation.) For our
purposes the term is useful in that we can
compare it to the idea of ITS. In applying
it to the meanings, institutions, and
problems which impinge upon the field of
aging we seek to identify those areas in
which the established paradigm (i.e. the
relevant elements of the ITS) produce
anomalies which negatively affect not only
those who are aged, but the coherence of
the society as a whole. The highlighting
of these anomalies and the development of
experimental alternative conceptualizations
may lead to the reconstruction of the ITS
in a way that it will make it more
genuinely possible to meet the needs of
people.
Elements of the American Thought Structure
It is not our purpose to suggest a set
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of systematically interrelated elements
which constitute the ITS of modern American
society. Others, notably Peter Berger, in
The Homeless Mind, Milton Rokeach, and on a
more popular level, Alvin Toffler and
Christopher Lasch have made attempts to
bring a synthesis to the consciousness of
modernity. (11) Our ambitions are more
modest in the sense that we seek to
identify simply an array of values and
associated cognitive structures, elements
of the its which appear to impinge
negatively upon the process of growing old,
and which perpetuate the oppression of the
aged.
We suggest that these elements of
meaning which originate in the culture and
history of the West, have evolved to a
point where the institutional forms which
emerged from them have become detrimental
to the well being of all persons in our
society since we all age and eventually we
all grow old. They lead to anomalies which
diminish human potentiality. In short they
produce problems for which we must identify
other than incremental, culture-bound,
"normal" solutions.
It is largely accepted without question
that:
1. The existing arrangements and
distribution of power and political
authority in America are good and
desirable.
2. Social problems stem primarily from
individual, rather than social
structural deficiencies.
3. Human beings have differential
worth, related to their
productivity, which legitimizes the
unequal distribution of rights.
4. Each person is ultimately
responsible for her/him self; The
social provision for meeting human
needs is viewed residually.
5. Instrumental reason, which informs
scientific and technological
progress, will ultimately resolve
all problems of society.
We will discuss each of these five
societal assumptions separately.
The Social Construction of Old Age -- A
Critical Appraisal
1. The legitimacy of the Political StatusQua
The political system of the United
States is commonly understood to resemble a
giant market. Separately and together, the
variety of actors function so as to
maximize their individual good, which in
turn is thought to produce the best of all
possible societies. (12) The status Quo is
legitimate (i.e. labeled just), and
normatively dignified because it exists,
and is the product of a just process. (13)
It permits and encourages conflict among
individuals and groups, but only within
legitimate constraints, such as those of
the market. Only those actions which are
pursued in conformity with its rules are
"realistic", i.e. realism becomes
synonymous with system maintenance.
The aged population has in recent years
been viewed increasingly as an interest
group which competes within this postulated
market for resources and power. Thus it is
assumed that:
1. The major concerns of the aged will
constitute a portion of the
political agenda.
2. Appropriate policies and programs
will emerge to meet the interest
and needs of the aged.
3. The aged are receiving their fair
share within the system of partisan
mutual adjustment.
In order to enhance this capacity to
influence the political process, the aged
are advised to organize, to form
coalitions, and to lobby the centers of
decision-making power. (14) Their failure
to achieve their ends is to be accounted
for by their lack of effective
organization, their political apathy, their
minority status, or their lack of effective
(popular or professional) leadership. But,
on the whole it is assumed that since the
political system produces and defines
justice, the welfare of the aged population
is assured, to the extent that they can
reasonably be considered entitled. In sum,
politically there is not much more that can
be done.
2. Individual Deficiencies
The emphasis on individual deficiencies
as contrasted with social-structural
problems has been dramatically labeled,
"blaming the victim." It assumes that, if
a condition is problematic, then the
(deviant) individual is guilty and must
change. This assumption is directly linked
to the claim that this is the best of all
possible societies.
Deviant behavior is thought to fall
into two broad categories -- that for which
the individual is at fault and that for
which the individual is blameless.
Fortunately for the aged, they are
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generally held blameless for the
deficiencies associated with their advanced
years. This can be explained, in large
part, by the fact that aging is popularly
construed not only as being associated with
illness, but also as being illness.
Illnesses are considered, in this society,
to be beyond the fault of the victim.
Aging, viewed as a process of physical
and mental deterioration, serves as the
dominant explanation for the "problem" of
old age. It is assumed that this process
is inevitable, chronic, and natural. In
essence it is viewed as an entropic
process, culminating in death, whose
effects might be retarded or mitigated
primarily by the provision of medical
services, but never reversed. Death is an
important medical event; it is the
ultimate illness.
All individuals of a given age are
normatively expected to behave in certain
ways and to exhibit particular problematic
symptoms. Specific social institutions are
structured so as to respond to these
expected behaviors and deficiencies. The
circle is completed when individuals learn
to live up to the expectations which are
imposed upon them. "Don't listen to me,
I'm just a crazy old codger," they
disarmingly have been taught to say, and to
half believe. Thus we trace the "moral
career" of the stigmatized elderly. (15)
This is the most pernicious consequence of
agism: the victims begin to believe the
doctrine in the name of which they are
oppressed. (16).
The political consequence of blaming
the victim in the field of aging is to make
it possible for society to avoid
confronting the most universal social
structural problem faced by millions of
-33-
elderly, economic deprivation.
3. Inequaity
In Western society high social status
is correlated with what is socially
evaluated as economic productivity.
Productivity is thought to derive from the
investment of wealth and/or from what is
defined as work. Those who are younger,
vigorous, daring, white, male, and in
possession of utilitarian skills are most
likely to be working. Thus the aged,
except for those few who are wealthy, are
viewed as being nonproductive and of low
social status. They are "surplus people."
(17)
Inequality in the distribution of
rights, in the sense that David Gil uses
the word, is normatively justified as a
stimulus to productivity. (18) Whereas
equality is popularly promoted as an ideal
in Western society, it is applied primarily
to the "spiritual," less to the political,
and not as all to the economic sphere.
Poverty among the aged in America is
entirely consistent with the powerful
Puritan motto ascribed to Captain Myles
Standish that, he who does not work should
not eat. Wisdom, honor, life experience,
long suffering, etc. simply will not serve
as values worthy of economic reward.
There are multiple additional
consequences of the low social status of
the aged related to, but not systematically
determined by their poverty. Their civil
rights are easily violated, as in the
imposition of involuntary institutional-
ization. It is popularly acceptable to
think and speak of older people as if they
were children whose lives have to be
managed, and who have little capacity to
make sensible decisions for themselves.
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They are expected to enjoy playing games,
modeling with clay, and taking afternoon
naps, much like children. When they are
forced out of the labor force because they
are assumed to be incompetent, inefficient,
and unreliable, the elderly are subtly
taught to accept these allegedly inevitable
consequences of biological aging. Old age
is believed to be neither functional nor
very profitable. Thus it is thought to be
purposeless.
4. Individual Responsibility - Societal
Neglect
One of the most salient myths of
American society is that of the "self-made
man". Aside from its obvious sexist
implications (can there be a self-made
woman?), this myth gives expression to the
social ideal of the autonomous and
ambitious individualist who, by means of
sheer determination and hard work, achieves
success. Ideally, government minimally
regulates individual ambition. Wilensky
and Lebeaux' familiar distinction between
residual and institutional social services
is misleading. (19) It obscures the fact
that all social welfare services in America
are fundamentally residual, in the sense
that they provide help and regulate the
behavior of citizens who, ideally, should
be independent and helping themselves.
Within this "culture of narcissism,"
where self-fulfillment and self-
aggrandizement have become the socially
sanctioned ideal, even duty and service to
others are subsumed under the category of
self-interest. (20) Thus, if benefits are
provided for the elderly, the best
justification for this limited largess is
that, eventually, all of us will arrive at
the same place. It is self-interest that
justifies and explains the public interest. (21)
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There is no need to review the retinue
of underfunded services and programs which
characterize the field of aging. Their
emphasis is on crisis intervention and
custodial care rather than on planning and
prevention. The approach is segmented and
problem-oriented rather than holistic.
Often demeaning approaches to service are
the consequence of treating individuals as
if they were objects, or commodities.
People are helped, but usually given little
opportunity to reciprocate . . . This is
one of the more refined forms of
humiliation.
The most dangerous consequence of the
residual social service approach to meeting
the needs of the elderly is that is serves
as an explanation and a justification,
proposing that something ia being done.
But in fact nothing much is changed. The
social service providers help to perpetuate
the problems and the oppression because
their actions do not significantly impact
upon the political and cognitive context
within which the problems associated with
old age are defined. (22)
3. Progress and Rationality
Instrumental reason, often defined to
be synonymous with rationality, involves
the calculation of constantly more precise
and more efficient means for the
accomplishment of utilitarian ends. (23)
Modern empirical science, the institutional
incarnation of instrumental reason, has as
its goal the ever greater mastery over
nature. Progress in the modern world is
thought to coincide largely with the
progress of empirical science and of
derived technologies. It is assumed that
this value-neutral science, which has
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become synonymous with reason and the
source of all true knowledge, will
ultimately solve the problems of all
mankind. (24)
In the field of aging, one of the
consequences of this belief in empirical
science, or "scientism" as it is called by
the critical theorists, is the inordinate
emphasis placed upon biological aging. (25)
It is as if the physical deterioration of
the body were the main problem and
deathlessness the idealized goal. Here
also the emphasis is upon the individual
and his/her deficiencies. The solution is
assumed to be technical/mechanical, and the
social institutional issues are avoided.
As before, aging is viewed as a type of
pathology and death becomes the ultimate
illness. Ironically, progress in life
culminates in the denial of life's
progress, in death.
A second, less obvious consequence of
the belief in the invincibility of science
and in progress is that it acquires a quasi-
normative status, i.e. we moderns claim to
be better than our predecessors because of
our greater knowledge. The effect of this
pretentious cognition upon the process of
aging is expressed in the relationship
between generations. Whereas in Africa and
parts of Asia the aged are highly regarded
because they are thought to be closer to
the Source, among us the aged are
denigrated because it is assumed that they
know less and therefore are less competent.
(26) The younger generations reign over
their elders not only because they are
physically stronger and economically
advantaged, but also because they are
assumed to be closer to the Truth.
In the realm of public policy the most
mathematical of the social sciences,
economics, has become the paradigm for
rationality. Every decision is assumed to
have a quantifiable cost and an equally
quantifiable benefit. The ideologically
based judgments which are implicit in
cost/benefit analysis are easily
overlooked. (27) Thus in the field of
aging, whereas service provision might, and
often has been made profitable and
efficient, it is impossible to make the
claim that promoting the well-being of
older persons is a cost-effective way to
utilize societal resources.
Summax
In reviewing these key elements of the
contemporary ITS, basic conceptualizations
relating to power, guilt and
responsibility, work, self-sufficiency,
progress and rationality, we do not make
the assumption that this -is an ideology
which is cynically imposed upon society by
oppressors from above. Rather, these ideas
have their roots in the political,
cultural, economic, religious and
philosophic history of the West. This
thought structure has been internalized by
all of us who have been socialized into
this late twentieth century world. To
bring about a change which is genuinely
liberating requires critical thinking and
critical learning about those who control
the major institutions of society, among
the professionals who manage them, and most
especially among those who populate them.
We proceed in the next section with the
task of critical thinking and move toward
critical learning, leading to a sort of
"desocialization," in order to make
possible resocialization to new,
alternative paradigms of thought and
action. (28)
-38-
The aim of the remainder of this paper
is to propose a series of alternative
elements for a thought structure which, it
is hoped will avoid some of the present
anomalies associated with growing older and
becoming aged. We have attempted to link
these ideas to action proposals which have
as their goal the rapid institutional-
ization of these new meanings.
The five alternative elements which we
propose are approximately, but not fully
parallel to the five key elements in the
ITS which have been discussed above.
1. The legitimacy of the institution-
alized thought structure is
constantly open to question and
challenge in the light of changing
social and historical circum-
stances,
The legitimacy of inherited ideas is
maintained primarily by those who have
power. But both the source and the meaning
of this power require critical examination.
We would observe that, whereas the
unquestioning acceptance of established
authority invites tyranny, its opposite,
total distrust of all social bonds of
unequal power, is equally destructive of
the possibility of social order. (29) It
is not so much that a middle road must be
found, as that a new social understanding
of the meaning of power and authority must
be formed.
We offer no simple formula for such a
new understanding. We believe that it must
not continue to be based upon the
(masculine) capacity for violence and the
political legitimation of coercive force.
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Elements of an Alternative Thouaht
What we have in mind is closer to the
Ghandian concept of sat xagha%, truth
force, given a Western coloration. (30)
The new power struggle which we envision is
not to be limited to the confines of the
established debate among vested political
interests. Rather, the struggle must be at
he level of a people's movement. It
involves the recognition that the needed
changes in people's lives will not be
imposed from above, and that the power
which counts is not the power of
domination, to control nature and lives of
others. Rather it is the power to control
one's own life collectively and
individually. (31)
For the aged this means the recognition
of the severe limits of age-centered
advocacy politics within the pluralistic
context. Aging must become everyone's
concern because aging is synonymous with
living. It means "youth and aged
together," as the Grey Panthers have said,
promoting a people-centered rather than a
power-centered society. But slogans such
as these are not enough. In the life-world
of people and institutions it means the
building of economic and psychological
independence from centralized control by
strengthening self-help and mutual-help
networks among all people. It means
reducing dependence upon the mysteries of
expertise, calling upon the under-
utilized resources of youth and old age
whose talents have been systematically
defined as surplus. As we shall suggest
below, this leads not simply to the
expansion of voluntarism but an expansion
of the meaning of work.
2. Social problems derive primarily from
problematic social conditions.
The problems associated with old age,
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the most pervasive of which are poverty,
loneliness, and a sense of uselessness, can
in large part be resolved by social-
institutional changes rather than by
changes demanded of the individual. We
would suggest that physical well-being,
which is intricately intertwined with the
maintenance of a physically, socially, and
mentally healthy life style, is not
primarily dependent upon medical care.
Poverty is not usually overcome by welfare
payments and loneliness is not
significantly reduced by counseling.
One of the types of social
institutional change that is likely to be
most productive for the reduction of
problems associated with aging involves a
major restructuring of the normative lime
cycle. (32) This means the redistribution
of leisure, learning, work, and rest in a
different sequence along the life course.
Thus, opportunities for temporary
retirement might be provided to parents
when their children are infants. Work
opportunities might be created for
adolescents who do not care to study.
Study leaves are offered to workers who are
suffering from burn-out, and employment is
made available for those who are older and
do not care to remain at leisure.
The sequences of the normative life
cycle derive from an era when life
expectancy was much lower, when most women
remained in the home, and old age was a
rarity, when men were expected to hold one
job for a lifetime, and only a minority of
the population were educated beyond grade
school. A major restructuring of
activities and sequences along the life
course is likely to make many of the
current problems associated with not only
old age, but also youth and middle age,
obsolete.
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3. All human beings are equal in worth
regardless of their capacity to produce
or their socially ascribed status.
A full agreement with the principle of
human equality as carefully defined by the
English social philosopher, R. W. Tawney,
requires not only that all persons are
regarded equal, regardless of sex, race,
creed, or national origin, but also that
they have equal civil, human and material
rights, regardless of their relationship to
the means of production. (33) Equality
constitutes a cognition of others which
neither unjustly glorifies them, nor is
demeaning. While not a simple concept, its
aim is to require the equal distribution of
rights and the equal allocation of
responsibilities among all citizens.
For the aged (and for all others who
are not currently attached to the labor
force) the application of the ideals of
equality cold lead not only to the
elimination of the guilt which is usually
associated with this allegedly inferior
status, but also to the provision of an
adequate wage. The meaning of work could
be changed so as to include multiple new
activities such as cooking, housekeeping,
caring for family and neighbors, and giving
joy to others. (34) There is no reason
wages cannot be paid for these activities.
Such a redefinition of work would
necessitate a societal commitment to full
employment as a first priority. Our
economy which is increasingly oriented
toward the exchange of information and the
provision of services may have a better
potential of meeting this goal than the
rapidly declining industrial economy. (35)
4. To be human is to be a social being.
dependent upon and responsible for the
-42-
lives of others. To live is to share!le.&
Human beings are biologically,
economically and socially dependent on one
another. Not only economic goods but also
knowledge, language, and consciousness
itself are dependent upon communication
with others. The social Darwinist world
view of the survival of the fittest which
has been used to justify self-
aggrandizement might be replaced by
Kropotkin's theory of the survival of those
who cooperate. (36) Rather than assuming
that all of the world's goods are limited,
and therefore subject to the zero-sum rules
of economics, many of the most valued goods
are unlimited, subject to multiple-sum
rules, e.g. love, knowledge, health, oy
friendship, etc. The more you give, the
more your and we and all of us have.
From this perspective the contemporary
system of social welfare wherein everyone,
including those who are aged, is expected
to aim for maximum self-sufficiency and
independence from others can be viewed as a
unique,historical aberration. An alter-
native system would be based upon the
assumption that all persons, regardless of
age, are entitled to material and political
rights, not because they are worthy and
have worked hard, not because they are
diseased or disabled, but because they are
human, and all human beings need each other
to maintain their humanity. This includes
not only the right to medical care, of
food, or housing, but also the right to
give and to share of themselves with
others. Within the newer cohorts of
predominantly middle-class aged, maintain-
ing opportunities to give and share
knowledge, wisdom, talent, love, and
friendship is likely to e even more
significant than the opportunity to
-43-
receive. (37)
5. It is primarily cultural/historical
knowledge rather than the capacity for
technical mastery over nature which
grants coherence and meaningfulness to
human existence.
Rational human action requires more
than technical competence and includes a
vision of, and a compulsion to create the
good. (38) Such a vision is invariably a
product of the history and culture of a
people. Those who can only with difficulty
identify with it because they believe that
they are "self-made" and that the past and
future are irrelevant to their being in the
present, may be risking their own sanity.
(39)
For all persons, i.e. all of us who are
aging, such an understanding permits of a
cyclical, rather than an undirectional view
of life. Birth, growth and death all serve
to mark the rhythms of circular time.
People, generations, and civilizations come
and go. The solutions to today's problems
become the problems for tomorrow's
solutions. The frontiers of knowledge are
not all before us. We are not
unquestionably wiser than our forbears, and
in the past life was not uniformly squalid.
Our own life makes sense only as an
extension of the lives of others, those
with whom we share our lives now, those who
came before us, and those who will follow.
In short we would emphasize that life and
living is sacred, and only unimportantly
functional.
The practical
adoption of such an
would lead to the
institutions which
integrated. There
implications of the
alternative conception
development of social
are maximally age
would remain little
justification for maintaining educational
institutions and welfare programs which
utilize chronological age as the primary
criterion in the allocation of benefits to
individuals. The classification of adults
by age would in many settings become
totally irrelevant.
Aside from the major implications of
such a changed view of the self in the
world and in history, this alternative
conception might rid us of such notions as
the obsolescence of the aged, the
fearfulness of death, and the idea that
time is our master. This would enable us
to cease committing major societal
resources toward the control of death, and
instead focus on the never-ending spiritual
need to celebrate live, through music, are,
science, and poetry.
Implication for change in the profession of
Social Work
We have suggested a series of
alternative conceptualizations, ideas
affecting the way we think about time,
work, power, and reality. We have asserted
that change on the institutional level,
change that can genuinely lead to the
alleviation and prevention of social
problems, must include changes in
societally defined meanings. In this final
section, our purpose is to touch briefly
upon how these ideas might impact upon the
profession of social work.
Social workers who are in substantial
agreement with the critical approach which
has been developed in this paper are likely
to want to engage in any or all of the
following actions:
1. Join in exposing the destructive
consequences of present belief
systems as they impact upon
individual lives, upon social
institutions, and most
specifically, upon the system of
social services intended to meet
the needs of the elderly.
2. Expand upon the types of
alternative conceptualization which
we have begun to suggest and join
with others who are like-minded in
creating a new language of human
welfare.
3. Work toward the experimental
institutionalization of these mean-
ings in new, innovative settings.
Effective engagement in actions of this
type involves a significant level of
personal risk. Most of us inconsistently
try to maintain ourselves in this world,
while simultaneously investing important
energies in giving shape to the other
world, the world that should be. The trick
is to try to be what we want to become,
individually and together. But in this
effort we are easily sidetracked, mainly
because there is an inconsistence between
what we intellectually know, and what we
feel. The rationalizations are many. We
get coopted into serving what are defined
as the pressing needs now. We have to be
"realistic" despite our knowledge that in
helping sustain the limits of realism we
become both perpetrators and victims of
injustice. We yearn for an elusive
personal security, and for what is absurdly
called success. In short, full engagement
in challenging the ITS includes a threat to
our status and our claimed rights as
professionals.
Social workers, like other
professionals, are in an important way an
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elite group in contemporary society. They
participate in "mythmaking" as it affects
their area of expertise, from a position of
authority. (40) As elites, they help to
structure meanings, language, and
expectations within the society as a whole,
and most especially among their clients.
(41) Thus, the authority to designate a
particular interventive act as helping,
rather than as oppression, and the right to
define categories of deviance are largely
granted to social workers as an implicit
professional right and responsibility. As
Edelman cogently suggests, the language of
helping that social workers use is a
political language and its utilization in
practice is a political act. (42)
We would therefore suggest that the
political resources that accompany the
professional status of social workers be
harnessed to bring abut change in both the
social welfare system and the profession
itself. We look forward to the historical
evolution of the post-professional helper.
Post-professional social work practice
is overtly political. It does not attempt
to hide behind the skirts of what is
neither an objective scientific knowledge
base nor a value neutral technology. Its
primary loyalty is toward those who are
systematically disadvantaged, not to
particular institutions, methodologies,
agencies, or professional associations.
Post-professional will be wary of
classification and categorization of
individuals by age, sex, race, or
disability. They recognize that within
this society, shaped by this ITS,
distinctions such as these are easily used
to pit one disadvantaged constituency
against another. They know that the truly
needy includes nearly everybody. Post-
professional practice never ceases to be
self-critical, recognizing that both
traditional professionalism as well as the
types of practice that are likely to
succeed it are to be understood only within
their historical and cultural context:
they are meaningful only within their
particular space and time. (43)
Thus will the continued exploitation of
talent, the genius, the experience, and the
commitment of social workers in the service
of an unjust social order be gradually
converted to a new, authentic form of
practice. Those who would challenge these
views because they appear to be hopelessly
utopian and unrealistic should know that
every argument for realism, in the final
analysis, is but an argument for the
prevention of change.
As for the field of aging, this is an
area in which great opportunities lie
before us. Politically, this opportunity
derives from the fact that all human beings
are included; the potential constituency is
everyone. Social workers tragically share
with other helping professionals, and with
the society as a whole, negative attitudes
toward aging and old age. (44) They must
start there, changing not merely their own
attitudes, but also, and more
fundamentally, the basic meanings for the
entire society. As a new ITS becomes more
fully developed and understood, we can
expect social workers to evolve different
approaches to, for example, health as
distinguished from medicine, regeneration
as distinguished from retirement, lifetime
wages as distinguished from OASDI. If
these efforts and others like them are
successful, they may lead to the creation
of new people's movements including al of
us, young and old, who share in this vision
of power for liberation not domination,
work for fulfillment not exploitation, life
and service to meet the needs of people not
for profit, and knowledge to re-endow the
world with sacredness, not for utility.
(45).
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